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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Daniel Chernobieff appeals from the district court's decision affirming the 
judgment entered upon Chernobieff's guilty plea to driving under the influence. 
Chernobieff contends the district court erred in affirming the magistrate's denial 
of Chernobieff's motion to suppress evidence of his blood alcohol content, 
claiming the inability to contact the on-call magistrate to obtain a warrant after 
hours, in conjunction with the dissipation of alcohol, is an "impermissible 
categorical exception to the warrant requirement" prohibited by Missouri v. 
McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1552 (2013). 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
At 11 :22 p.m., Corporal Matthew Sly responded to a request for 
assistance from another officer for the purpose of conducting an investigation of 
whether Chernobieff was driving under the influence. (Tr., p.7, L.1 - p.9, L.12; 
R., p.35.) Upon making contact with Chernobieff, Corporal Sly noticed 
Chernobieff's eyes were "glassy and bloodshot" and Corporal Sly "could smell 
the odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from inside [Chernobieff's] vehicle." 
(Tr., p.10, Ls.2-10.) After Chernobieff got out of the car, Corporal Sly also 
smelled "the strong odor of an alcoholic beverage on [Chernobieff's] breath," and 
Chernobieff's "speech was slow and lethargic." (Tr., p.12, Ls.12-15, p.13, Ls.9-
14.) Chernobieff was also agitated and appeared to have difficulty answering 
questions. (Tr., p.14, Ls.14-25.) Based on these observations, Corporal Sly 
asked Chernobieff to perform field sobriety tests, but Chernobieff refused. (Tr., 
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p.14, L.21 - p.15, L.10.) Chernobieff also refused the breath test Corporal Sly 
requested after arresting Chernobieff for driving under the influence. (Tr., p.15, 
L.11-p.16, L.19.) 
Because Chernobieff refused to submit to a breath test, Corporal Sly 
contacted the prosecutor to request assistance in obtaining a warrant for a blood 
sample. (Tr., p.16, L.20 - p.19, L.1.) After several unsuccessful attempts by the 
prosecutor to reach the "on-call judge" in order to get a warrant, the prosecutor 
instructed Corporal Sly to "go ahead and take the blood due to exigent 
circumstances." (Tr. p.18, Ls.15-24, p.19, Ls.18-24, p.26, L.16 - p.28, L.9.) 
Corporal Sly did so; the test results indicated Chernobieff's blood alcohol content 
was .226. (Tr., p.19, L.25 - p.20, L.1 O; R., p.37.) 
The state charged Chernobieff with driving under the influence with an 
excessive blood alcohol content. (See R., pp.37, 63.) Chernobieff filed a motion 
to suppress asserting the "blood draw, conducted without a warrant, violated his 
Fourth Amendment rights under both the United States and Idaho Constitutions." 
(R., p.27.) The magistrate denied Chernobieff's motion, finding the exigent 
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement applied to the facts of this 
case. (Tr., p.45, Ls.14-16.) Chernobieff thereafter entered a conditional guilty 
plea reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress, and the 
magistrate withheld judgment. (R., pp.60, 63, 65.) Chernobieff timely appealed 
to the district court, and the district court affirmed. (R., pp.71-73, 116-122.) 




Chernobieff states the issues on appeal as: 
1. WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING 
THAT THE MAGISTRATE'S FINDINGS OF FACT WAS [SIC] 
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANCIAL [SIC] AND COMPETANT [SIC] 
EVIDENCE. 
2. WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING 
THE DENIAL OF THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE RESULTS 
OF THE BLOOD DRAW. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.3 (capitalization original).) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Chernobieff failed to show any error in the district court's decision 
affirming the magistrate's denial of Chernobieff's motion to suppress evidence of 
his excessive blood alcohol content because the exigent circumstances 
exception applied to the warrantless blood draw? 
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ARGUMENT 
Chernobieff Has Failed To Show Any Error In The District Court's Decision 
Affirming The Magistrate's Denial Of Chernobieff's Motion To Suppress 
Evidence Of His Excessive Blood Alcohol Content 
A Introduction 
Chernobieff contends the district court erred in affirming the magistrate's 
denial of his motion to suppress evidence of his excessive blood alcohol content. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.3-13.) Chernobieff presents two arguments in support of 
this claim: (1) the magistrate's and district court's findings of fact are not 
supported by substantial and competent evidence, and (2) the district court erred 
in agreeing with the magistrate's finding that the exigent circumstances exception 
to the warrant requirement applies in this case. (Appellant's Brief, pp.8-13.) 
Both of Chernobieff's arguments fail. The evidence presented at the 
suppression hearing and the applicable law support the district court's decision. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate 
appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's 
decision." State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709,711,184 P.3d 215,217 (Ct. App. 
2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)). The 
appellate court "examine[s] the magistrate record to determine whether there is 
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact 
and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings." kl 
"The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, [this Court] accept[s] the trial 
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court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but [the Court] 
freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found." 
Statev. Faith, 141 ldaho728, 730, 117P.3d 142, 144(Ct.App.2005). 
C. Chernobieff's Complaints About The Courts' Findings Are Without Merit 
In analyzing whether the magistrate properly denied Chernobieff's request 
for suppression, the district court stated, in relevant part: 
The magistrate found that there were [ ] exigent circumstances in 
this ca~e. Considerations which the magistrate articulated included 
a determination that the defendant delayed the process by refusing 
to take field sobriety tests, the events occurred at 11 :DO p.m., the 
prosecutor made a good faith effort to obtain a warrant through the 
process of an on-call judge who could not be reached, and there 
was no system in place to go to a backup judge. Those findings 
are supported by the record. Whether they rise to the level of 
exigency is the question. The lynch pin [sic] of that decision 
revolves around the failed attempt to obtain a warrant through the 
system in place for an on-call magistrate. By themselves the 
lateness of the hour and the refusals to take field sobriety tests 
would not constitute exigent circumstances. They are likely 
common conditions. They may be weighed in the totality of the 
circumstances. Similarly, the change in blood alcohol level as time 
passes is a natural occurrence that an expeditious process seeks 
to limit. The final link to establish exigent circumstances is whether 
the failure within the judicial system can be weighed. See [Missouri 
v.] McNeely, 133 S.Ct. [1552,] 1562-63 [(2013)] ("[l]mprovements in 
communications technology do not guarantee that a magistrate 
judge will be available when an officer needs a warrant after 
making a late-night arrest ... exigent circumstances justifying a 
warrantless blood sample may arise in the regular course of law 
enforcement due to delays from the warrant application process .. 
. [.] Whether a warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving suspect is 
reasonable must be determined case by case based on the totality 
of the circumstances."). See also February 4, 2014 Hearing 
Transcript, at 41: "At 11 :DO p.m. there is only one on-call judge, 
and even if Mr. Bandy were to call another judge and get that judge 
up, that judge isn't really situated to hear probable cause because 
the one digital recorder we have is with the on-call judge. So it's 
kind of a pickle when you can't reach the on-call judge." This is a 
problem one might expect more in a small county rather than in 
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Ada County. In any event, the determination of exigent 
circumstances made by the magistrate is supported by the record. 
However, and this is a very weighty however, this breakdown has 
been exposed and can be addressed by a redundancy system, at 
least where multiple judges are available. The logic of the old 
adage that every dog gets one bite is applicable in this realm. It is 
very likely that a failure in the judicial process in the future will not 
weigh as an exigency unless that failure is tied to a failure of 
equipment or some other factor not controllable in the court system 
itself. 
(R., pp.121-122 (brackets and ellipses original).) 
With respect to the district court's decision, Chernobieff first challenges 
the district court's determination that the magistrate made a finding that 
Chernobieff "delayed the investigation." (Appellant's Brief, p.9.) Chernobieff 
argues that the magistrate did not, in fact, make such a finding because, "when 
asked about the delay, the magistrate stated, '[a]II I am saying is he wasn't 
cooperating ..... It may-may or may not have been a time delay."' (Appellant's 
Brief, p.9 (quoting, in part, Tr., p.49, Ls.15-20).) Chernobieff's argument ignores 
the context of the magistrate's comments and, in any event, his complaint is 
ultimately irrelevant to whether the district court correctly affirmed the 
magistrate's application of the exigent circumstances exception. 
After the presentation of evidence at the suppression hearing, the 
magistrate made a finding that Chernobieff "did delay the process." (Tr., p.46, 
Ls.7-8.) This finding was undoubtedly made in response to Chernobieff's 
argument that application of the exigent circumstances "has to do with whether 
or not the defendant is intentionally delaying the process" (Tr., p.39, Ls.19-21), 
and the evidence that Chernobieff delayed the state's ability to obtain evidence 
of his intoxication and blood alcohol content by refusing field sobriety and breath 
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tests (Tr., p.15, Ls.4-10, p.16, Ls.18-19). After the magistrate made his findings, 
defense counsel sought clarification of the magistrate's decision, which included 
the following exchange: 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: ... The Court is finding that there 
was a delay in the process? 
THE COURT: I'm -- I'm saying that he couldn't have waited 
until morning to get a search warrant because the blood does 
dissipate. It would have been useless. So as McNeeley [sic] 
stated, there are time factors. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And -- I'm -- I'm clarifying the 
Court's ruling that my client delayed the process that - by not 
participating in the field sobriety test, didn't he speed up the 
process. 
THE COURT: You know, all I'm saying is he wasn't 
cooperating. Because he didn't cooperated [sic] -- didn't 
cooperate, that triggered another set of events. It may -- may or 
may not have been a time delay. But he forced Corporal Sly to 
seek the warrant because he didn't cooperate. 
(Tr., p.49, Ls.4-20.) 
As the magistrate explained, his finding that Chernobieff delayed the 
process was related to his lack of cooperation with respect to evidentiary testing, 
which necessarily resulted in a delay in obtaining evidence of his intoxication. 
The district court did not err in concluding that finding was supported by the 
evidence. Even if the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of delay, as 
defined by the magistrate, the lack of delay attributable to Chernobieff does not 
mean the exigent circumstances exception does not apply. For the reasons set 
forth in Section D, infra, the law and the evidence presented supports a finding of 
exigency. 
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Chernobieff next complains about the district court's reliance on the 
"failure in the judicial process" in finding an exigency in this case because the 
state did not present any evidence that "this was the first and only time that such 
a breakdown of the on-call magistrate system had occurred." (Appellant's Brief, 
p.9.) According to Chernobieff, "[i]f the failure of the system is to be a factor in 
evaluating the totality of the circumstances, then it is necessary to know if the 
same problem had happened before." (Appellant's Brief, p.9.) Chernobieff's 
argument fails because it relies on the incorrect premise that the inability to 
reach the on-call magistrate in this case could only be a factor in the exigency 
analysis if a prosecutor never encountered the same problem in the past. The 
proper analysis is whether, under the totality of the circumstances in this case, 
the needs of law enforcement were sufficiently compelling that it was reasonable 
to conduct the blood draw without a warrant. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1558. For 
the reasons that follow, this standard was satisfied. 
D. The Exigent Circumstances Present In This Case Excused The Warrant 
Requirement 
Under the Fourth Amendment, warrantless searches are presumptively 
unreasonable absent an exception. State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 419, 337 
P.3d 575, 578 (2014) (citations omitted). Exigency is a "well-recognized 
exception[] to the warrant requirement." kl (citing Kentucky v. King, 131 S.Ct. 
1849 (2011 )). The exigency exception "'applies when the exigencies of the 
situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless 
search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment."' McNeely, 133 
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S.Ct. at 1558 (quoting King, 131 S.Ct. at 1856). Pursuant to this exception, "law 
enforcement officers may conduct a search without a warrant to prevent the 
imminent destruction of evidence." McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1559 (citations 
omitted). "To determine whether a law enforcement officer faced an emergency 
that justified acting without a warrant, this Court looks to the totality of the 
circumstances." 19.:. 
In McNeely, the Supreme Court addressed whether the dissipation of 
alcohol creates a per se exigency and concluded it does not. 133 S.Ct. at 1560-
1561. In reaching this conclusion, the Court acknowledged that "a significant 
delay in [blood alcohol] testing will negatively affect the probative value of the 
results," but decided this was not a sufficient reason to "depart from [a] careful 
case-by-case assessment of exigency." 19.:. at 1561. Thus, the Court advised: 
"In those drunk-driving investigations where police officers can reasonably obtain 
a warrant before a blood sample can be drawn without significantly undermining 
the efficacy of the search, the Fourth Amendment mandates that they do so." 19.:. 
(citation omitted). Importantly for purposes of this case, the Court also stated: 
"exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless blood sample may arise in the 
regular course of law enforcement due to delays from the warrant application 
process." 19.:. at 1563. 
Chernobieff contends "[t]he exception used by the State in this case is an 
impermissible categorical exception to the warrant requirement," and appears to 
argue that a failure in the warrant process cannot constitute an exigency. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.12-13.) Chernobieff is incorrect. 
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The exigency in this case was created by the dissipation of alcohol and 
the inability to obtain a warrant despite Corporal Sly's and the prosecutor's 
efforts to do so. In other words, Corporal Sly "could not reasonably obtain a 
warrant before a blood sample [could] be drawn without significantly 
undermining the efficacy of the search." McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1561; see also 
Wulff, 157 Idaho at 420 n.3, 337 P .3d at 579 n.3 ("The Court [in McNeely] did not 
hold that the body's natural dissipation of alcohol can never provide an exigency 
exception to the warrant requirement, only that it cannot prove a per se 
exception."). The Fourth Amendment does not, as Chernobieff suggests, require 
law enforcement to "contact the magistrate through alternative methods," which 
Chernobieff does not identify, or to continue calling for some indeterminate 
period of time (Appellant's Brief, p.12), after the prosecutor has already made 
three to five calls and left at least one voicemail message with the on-call 
magistrate (Tr., p.27, Ls.1-14). At the suppression hearing, the prosecutor who 
was on-call the night Chernobieff was arrested detailed his efforts to obtain a 
warrant after Corporal Sly contacted him around midnight (Tr., p.17, Ls.6-20): 
Q. And did you receive any phone calls that evening? 
A. I did. I -- again, I don't recall what -- what time of the 
early morning it was, but it was from Trooper Sly. He initially called 
me from the field indicating that he had -- was performing a DUI 
investigation and there may be a need of a search warrant for a 
blood draw. 
Q. And what did you do after you received that phone call? 
A. I had Trooper Sly give me a run through of the 
reasonable, articulable suspicion for the stop, the PC for the 
investigation and the request for the blow as well as how the driver 
articulated his refusal to submit to a breathalyzer. 
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Q. And based on what he told you, what did you conclude? 
A. I concluded that we should seek the approval of the on-
call magistrate for a blood draw warrant to secure a sample of the 
driver's blood. Due to the evanescent nature of blood alcohol 
dissipating rapidly from the bloodstream, time was of the essence. 
Q. And so the phone call ended with [the] corporal and what 
did you do next? 
A. I instructed the corporal that I would make efforts to 
contact the on-call magistrate, which I believe at the time was 
Judge Mike Oths, and that I would call him back or that he should 
call me back if he hadn't heard from me once he arrived at the 
station at the -- at the intox room -- or at the Ada County Jail where 
the phlebotomist was going to respond. 
Q. Did he return your call? 
A. He did. In the interim I had attempted to call the on-call 
magistrate, Mike Oths, using the personal cell number of his that I 
have. That is his requested method of contact. 
I called that number and received no response. I repeated 
the call to make sure that I dialed the correct number. I had -- I 
received his voice mail and left him a voice mail requesting that he 
return my call and the nature of my call was to request a blood 
draw warrant. 
Q. So how many times total did you call that number? 
A. I'm not sure if it was three or four, but I know -- I believe it 
was at least three. Upon a third call -- it was when I made contact 
with Trooper Sly -- I attempted to conference call in the judge, at 
which time we -- I received no response again and left a 
subsequent message. 
Q. Okay. So you made four to five attempts to contact the 
on-call judge? 
A. And I can -- I can tell you for sure it was three. It could 
have been five. It's early morning. I did leave at least one voice 
mail, maybe two. 
(Tr., p.25, L.7 - p.27, L.14.) 
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It was not until after several unsuccessful attempts to contact the on-call 
magistrate to obtain a search warrant that the prosecutor instructed Corporal Sly 
to proceed under the exigent circumstances exception. 1 (Tr., p.27, L.23 - p.28, 
L.9.) The magistrate and the district court both correctly concluded that the 
prosecutor's advice was constitutionally sound. Chernobieff's claim that 
application of the exigent circumstances exception in this case is contrary to 
McNeely is without merit as the language in McNeely expressly acknowledges 
the potential for exigency in these very circumstances. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 
1563 ("exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless blood sample may arise in 
the regular course of law enforcement due to delays from the warrant application 
process"). 
Chernobieff has failed to show he was entitled to suppression of the blood 
test results in this case. 
1 Chernobieff asserts only "five-to-ten minutes [ ] elapsed while the on call 
prosecutor attempted to call the magistrate." (Appellant's Brief, p.12.) This 
assertion is belied by the record. Corporal Sly testified he contacted the on-call 
prosecutor while still on scene and the prosecutor told Corporal Sly to call him 
when he got to the jail. (Tr., p.17, L.15- p.18, L.7, p.25, L.7 - p.26, L.14.) "In 
the interim," the prosecutor attempted to call the magistrate, but received no 
response. (Tr., p.26, Ls.16-21.) When Corporal Sly called from the jail, the 
prosecutor "attempted to conference call in the judge," while Corporal Sly was on 
the phone, but was again unsuccessful. (Tr., p.27, Ls.27, Ls.5-8.) At that point, 
the prosecutor told Corporal Sly "he would give them five or ten minutes and 
then he would call [Corporal Sly] back." (Tr., p.18, Ls.10-24.) 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered 
against Chernobieff and the district court's order denying Chernobieff's motion to 
suppress. 
DATED this 4th day of December, 2015. 
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